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Abstract 
 The quest for self-clarity, coherence, and consistency is thought by some to be a frequent 
motivating factor. Historically, self-focused thought and self-monitoring have been seen as 
means of increasing self-clarity. However, cross-sectional research has found a negative 
correlation between one specific type of self-focused thought, rumination, and self-concept 
clarity. The purpose of the following two research papers was to further examine the relationship 
between these two variables. The first paper consisted of a laboratory experiment in which 
rumination was induced and its effects on self-concept clarity were measured. The second paper 
consisted of an experience sampling study in which the relationship between rumination and 
self-concept clarity (SCC) was observed over time. Granger Causality Analysis was then used to 
infer temporal precedence of the variables. Together, these two experiments provide information 
on both the causal relationship between the variables as well as their naturalistic progression. 
The results have implications for the study of self-clarity as well as for the clinical treatment of 
rumination.   
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General Introduction 
 
 The topic of this dissertation is the relationship between self-concept clarity (SCC) and 
self-focused rumination. As both high rumination (e.g. Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993) and low SCC (e.g. Bigler, 
Neimeyer, & Brown, 2001; Campbell et al., 1996; Chang, 2001; Lee-Flynn, Pomaki, DeLongis, 
Biesanz & Puterman, 2011; Schwartz, Klimstra, Luyckx, Hale & Meestra, 2012) have been 
linked to aspects of low mood and psychopathology, further information on the relationship 
between these variables could have clinical import. Self-concept clarity refers to the structure of 
the self-concept and describes the extent to which the self-concept is clearly defined, internally 
consistent, and stable across time (Campbell, Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavallee, & Lehman, 1996). 
The maintenance of a sense of self-clarity and coherence has been posited to be a universal 
motivating factor by several separate personality and social psychology theories (Hogg, 2012; 
Landau, Greenberg, Sullivan, Routledge, & Arndt, 2009; McAdams, 2001; Swann & 
Burhmester, 2012). We define self-focused rumination as repetitive or intrusive thoughts about 
the self. Theoretical and research literature has presented multiple definitions and models of 
rumination (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Martin & Tesser, 1996; Matthews & Wells, 2004; 
Watkins, 2008; Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014). There are, however, areas of overlap. Each 
theory describes a thinking pattern that is repetitive in nature, occurs without environmental 
demands, and is to a certain extent automatic rather than purposeful. Though both SCC and 
rumination are frequently studied as personality traits, they can also be conceived as states that 
fluctuate over time (Moberly & Watkins, 2008; Nezlek & Plesko, 2001, Schwartz et al., 2011; 
Takano & Tanno. 2011).  
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 We predicted that a reciprocal relationship exists between the variables, such that a high 
frequency of rumination leads to low self-concept clarity, and a high degree of self-concept 
clarity leads to a lower frequency of rumination. In order to examine this relationship, two 
research studies were designed. The first study was a laboratory-based experiment. In this study, 
participants were randomly assigned to engage in either a rumination induction or distraction 
task. Their level of self-concept clarity was then measured and compared. The second study used 
experience sampling methodology in order to observe the relationship between the variables as 
they fluctuate during everyday life. Though presented sequentially, in actuality the studies were 
analyzed in tandem. The combination of the two methodologies allowed for the study of both the 
causal relationships between rumination and self-concept clarity as well as their progression in 
an ecologically valid setting. 
 This dissertation is organized as two papers, each describing one of the studies. The 
papers have been formatted in order to meet the requirements for a standard psychology journal. 
The introduction to the second paper has been abbreviated for the sake of the dissertation in 
order to avoid unnecessary repetition. Following the two papers, a general discussion addresses 
the issues that the two papers raise when viewed together, as well as the overall conclusions that 
can be reached.   
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The Effect of Rumination on Self-Concept Clarity 
 The addition of metacognitive theory to the study of rumination has added to our 
understanding of the mechanisms behind this potentially harmful thought process (Matthews & 
Wells, 2004; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001, 2003). Though rumination is frequently experienced 
as repetitive thoughts that are unintentional or beyond an individual’s control, and chronic 
rumination has been linked to depression (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993), people who ruminate often cite reasons 
to continue ruminating (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001). One such reason is the belief that 
ruminating on the self might increase self-insight and clarity (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). 
Further exploration of the relationship between self-clarity and rumination may provide 
important information for clinical interventions that mitigate the effects of harmful rumination.  
 The link between rumination and self-clarity is not without historical and theoretical 
precedence. Introspection and self-focused thought have traditionally been seen as one pathway 
towards self-knowledge. This is a significant motivating factor, as in Western culture a clear and 
coherent sense of self is highly prized (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Despite historical precedence, the 
nature of the relationship between rumination and self-clarity is uncertain. Correlational research 
has found a negative association between the variables (Campbell et al., 1996; Simsek, 2013). As 
of yet, no experimental study has examined the causal effect of rumination on self-clarity.  
Self-Concept Clarity 
Self-concept clarity (SCC) refers to the extent to which an individual’s self-beliefs are 
clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and stable (Campbell 1990; Campbell, et 
al., 1996). As such, SCC refers to perceptions of the structure rather than the content of the self-
concept: an individual can have high SCC and yet have consistently negative beliefs about the 
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self. Despite the theoretical distinction between SCC and self-concept content, high levels of 
SCC have consistently been associated with high levels of self-esteem (Campbell, 1990; 
Campbell et al., 1996; Nezlek & Plesko, 2001; Stinson, Wood, & Doxey, 2008). Self-concept 
clarity has also been negatively associated with aspects of psychopathology, such as depression 
(Bigler, Neimeyer, & Brown, 2001; Campbell et al., 1996; Chang, 2001; Lee-Flynn, Pomaki, 
DeLongis, Biesanz & Puterman, 2011; Schwartz, Klimstra, Luyckx, Hale & Meestra, 2012), 
neuroticism (Campbell et al., 1996), anxiety (Bigler et al., 2001; Schwartz et al., 2012), 
psychotic-like experiences (Cicero, Becker, Martin, Cocherty, & Kerns, 2013) and prolonged 
grief disorder (Boelen, Keijsers, & van den Hout, 2012).   
State SCC 
Self-concept clarity can be considered a trait, or relatively enduring psychological 
characteristic, as well as a state that changes according to situation and time (Nezlek & Plesko, 
2001). Though the majority of studies on SCC conceptualize it as a personality trait, studies that 
have measured daily changes in SCC (Schwartz et al., 2011) or twice-weekly changes in SCC 
(Nezlek & Plesko, 2001) have found that SCC levels fluctuate within individuals from one 
measurement to the next. Given that SCC in part measures stability of the self-concept over time, 
it is not surprising that low levels of trait SCC have been linked to higher levels of variability in 
state SCC (Nezlek & Plesko, 2001). Other psychological and social phenomena have also been 
linked to intra-individual variation in SCC. For example, previous research has found social 
events, such as the termination of a romantic relationship, can lead to decreases in SCC over time 
(Slotter, Gardner, & Finkel, 2010; Slotter, Emery, & Luchies, 2014). Another study in which 
SCC was measured twice-weekly found that negative daily events led to increased negative 
affect and decreased self-esteem, which in turn predicted decreased state SCC (Nezlek & Plesko, 
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2001). Thus, in addition to being a personality trait, SCC has been shown to be a state that can 
fluctuate over time in response to social and psychological variables.   
Motivation, Culture and SCC 
Several theorists have posited that individuals have an inherent motivation to strive for 
self-clarity, coherence, and consistency (Hogg, 2012; Landau, Greenberg, Sullivan, Routledge, 
& Arndt, 2009; McAdams, 2001; Swann & Burhmester, 2012). According to the uncertainty-
identity theory, people are motivated to reduce feelings of uncertainty about their identities 
(Hogg, 2007, 2012). In order to ameliorate self-uncertainty, individuals may increase their 
identification with social groups (Hogg, 2007, 2012). Rather than stemming from individual 
differences, uncertainty theory maintains that enduring differences in self-uncertainty are due to 
social contexts that give rise to self-confusion (Hogg, 2007). Similarly, self-verification theory 
describes individuals as motivated to maintain a sense of coherence in their self-views (Swann & 
Burhmester, 2012; Swann & Reed, 1981). People achieve self-coherence through cognitive 
biases that favour their self-views, as well as by seeking social environments that provide self-
confirming feedback (Swann & Burhmester, 2012).  Terror management theory (TMT) focuses 
more specifically on reasons for maintaining self-clarity. Based on TMT, humans use cultural 
worldviews as protection against thoughts of their own mortality and the terror that such 
thoughts would cause (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004). The creation of a clear and 
consistent self-concept would be one such means of denying their own mortality and the self’s 
eventual destruction (Landau et al., 2009).  Studies have shown that increasing mortality salience 
led participants with high need for structure to increase their SCC ratings (Landau et al., 2009).  
Despite the aforementioned theories, there are several reasons to question the universality 
of the drive for self-clarity. Indeed, the past three decades have seen a rise in literature on 
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cultural differences in self-representation, including in the emphasis on coherence and 
consistency of the self. The desire for a clear, consistent self may be more strongly emphasized 
in Western cultures. According to Peng & Nisbett (1999), Western cultures emphasize an 
Aristotelian approach to logic and contradiction. Individuals in these cultures are more likely to 
believe that no statement or event can be both true and false, and that every statement is either 
true or false. In other words, contradictions must be resolved in favour of one argument through 
the use of logic. Some Eastern cultures may encourage individuals to address contradiction using 
an entirely different approach, naïve dialecticism. The folk epistemology of naïve dialecticism is 
comprised of three principles: the world is in constant flux, reality is naturally full of 
contradictions, and everything is connected (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). These global approaches to 
processing contradiction can also be applied to how the self is construed. While individuals in 
Western cultures might emphasize a unitary, consistent and clearly defined self, individuals in 
naïve dialectical cultures might tolerate selves that have greater amounts of contradictions and 
are less stable across roles or situations (Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010).  
The research literature has provided some support for lower SCC in cultures with high 
naïve dialecticism (Campbell, 1996; English & Chen, 2007; Church, 2008; Suh, 2002). However, 
findings on culture and SCC depend on context in which SCC is considered. For example, 
English and Chen (2007) measured self-consistency across social roles and across different types 
of situations within social roles. They found that Asian Americans showed less self-consistency 
across social relationships compared to European Americans. On the other hand, there was no 
significant difference between Asian and European Americans in consistency across situations 
within specific social roles (English & Chen, 2007). Though SCC is still related to self-esteem 
and psychological wellbeing in cultures high in naïve dialecticism (Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, 
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Wang, & Hou, 2004), some studies have found that it is less predictive of these variables than in 
cultures low in naïve dialecticism (Campbell, 1996; Suh, 2002). Indeed, higher self-esteem 
ratings in cultures that have low dialecticism could be due to members’ need to synthesize self-
related information in favour of information that has a positive valence, whereas individuals with 
high naïve dialecticism may be more tolerant of a self-concept that is simultaneously composed 
of both positive and negative self-attributes (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004).  
Self-concept clarity is therefore both a trait and a state that can be influenced by culture, 
relationships, and life events. What remains uncertain is whether patterns of self-focused 
thinking, such as rumination, also influence SCC.  
Rumination 
 Rumination is a frequent topic of study in clinical, personality, and cognitive research. 
Perhaps because of this proliferation of research, rumination has been defined and modeled in 
many different ways. In the response styles theory (RST) of rumination, Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) 
defined rumination as repetitive thoughts regarding the symptoms, causes, and consequences of 
depressive mood. According to RST, ruminating on negative affect and negative cognition 
creates a maladaptive cycle that amplifies negative mood and impairs problem-solving abilities 
that might otherwise ameliorate the distress. The degree to which individuals engage in a 
ruminative response style is viewed as an individual difference. Now occasionally termed 
“depressive rumination,” this type of rumination predicts onset, severity, and duration of 
depressive episodes (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993).  
 Other theories of rumination have focused less on the depressive content of ruminative 
thought and more on discrepancies between an individual’s current situation and goal. Based on 
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control theories of behavior (Carver & Scheier, 1981), these theories stipulate that rumination 
occurs when goal attainment is frustrated on some level (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Matthews & 
Wells, 2004; Watkins, 2008). According to Martin and Tesser (1996), ruminative thoughts 
include any conscious thoughts that revolve around a common instrumental theme in the absence 
of any immediate environmental demands. These thoughts are unintentional and are believed to 
arise in response to discrepancy between a goal and a current situation. Though unintentional or 
repetitive thoughts may cause distress, in general rumination is seen as independent of mood or 
affect (Martin & Tesser, 1996). In terms of trait-level rumination, Martin and Tesser maintain 
that individuals differ in their abilities to generate alternate thoughts or alternative paths to goals 
as well as their ability to relinquish unattained goals. Rumination, on the other hand, is seen as a 
process that occurs in all individuals when goal attainment is threatened (Martin & Tesser, 
1996).  
 Martin and Tesser’s model of rumination is mirrored in several subsequent theories. 
Matthews and Wells’ (1996; 2004) self-regulatory executive function (S-REF) model of 
rumination expands on Martin and Tesser’s theories. According to the S-REF model, ruminative 
thoughts occur as an attempt to cope with a discrepancy within the self between a current state 
and a goal state. However, the S-REF model adds a metacognitive component to the theory, 
namely individuals who ruminate may hold the belief that rumination is an important and 
effective coping mechanism (Wells & Matthews, 1996). Once they begin ruminating, they might 
shift to negative metacognitive beliefs, such as that rumination is uncontrollable (Papageorgiou 
& Wells, 2003). In the S-REF model, rumination is a multifaceted phenomenon that has both a 
controlled quality as well as an involuntary aspect (Matthews & Wells, 2004). The S-REF 
models also rejects Martin and Tesser’s contention that rumination can be positively-valenced. 
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Like Martin and Tesser, Matthews and Wells (2004) believe that rumination occurs in non-
clinical populations. Rumination contributes to clinical disorders when the individual lacks other 
coping strategies and the rumination becomes self-perpetuating (Matthews & Wells, 2004).  
 The goal-discrepancy theory of rumination was further developed by Watkins (2008). 
Watkins’ elaborated control theory (ECT) of rumination includes information about the level of 
construal in the ruminative thoughts. Individuals who habitually use higher level, abstract 
construal tend to be more behaviourally consistent across situations as their behaviour is always 
being aimed towards the same superordinate goals. Individuals who use more situation-specific, 
concrete construal may be less consistent but more adaptive. Higher-level construals can become 
problematic when they are not properly operationalized on more concrete levels. Maladaptive 
rumination might occur when higher level, superordinate goals are not being reached but there is 
no clear way to operationalize behaviour in order to reach them.  
 Separate from the goal-disruption theories of rumination are those that emphasize self-
focused attention (SFA) and the motivation for rumination. Ingram (1990) defined SFA as 
awareness of internally generated information. Self-focused attention has since been linked to 
many types of distress and psychopathology (Ingram 1990; Mor & Winquist, 2002). However, in 
psychotherapy research, self-focused reflection has been theorized to lead to increased self-
awareness, self-knowledge, agency, and positive therapeutic change (e.g., Gendlin, 1962; Miller, 
Isaacs, & Haggard, 1965; Rennie, 2000; Rogers, 1958).  In response to these divergent findings, 
Trapnell and Campbell (1999) attempted to define what distinguishes adaptive from non-
adaptive SFA. They concluded that SFA can be helpful or unhelpful depending on the processes 
that motivate it. They defined unhelpful SFA as rumination, a series of chronic, repetitive 
thoughts about the self that are motivated by neurosis rather than by epistemological curiosity 
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(Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Furthermore, they conceptualized rumination as a trait-level 
individual difference (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). In the questionnaire devised to measure this 
self-focused rumination, items emphasize the intrusiveness of ruminative thoughts and the 
individual’s lack of control over their ruminative thinking (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). 
Subsequent studies have linked this self-focused rumination to depression, anxiety, and other 
measures of distress (Allan, 2010; Joireman, 2004; Joireman, Parrot, & Hammerslaw, 2002; 
Simsek, 2013; Takano & Tanno, 2009).  
 Though the models and definitions of rumination differ, there is also overlap. Each 
describes a pattern of thinking that is repetitive in nature, that can persist without immediate 
environmental demands, and that can be unintentional or automatic. Depressive rumination and 
self-focused rumination also stipulate that the focus of the ruminative thoughts must be the self 
or aspects of internal experience.  
State Rumination 
 In addition to being studied at the level of individual differences, rumination is also 
frequently studied as a temporary state.  Many studies have used an experience sampling design, 
in which participants are signaled at multiple time points to indicate their degree of rumination 
along with other variables (Moberly & Watkins, 2008; Takano & Tanno, 2011) or daily diary 
methods (Brinker & Dozois, 2009; Ciesla, Reilly, Dickson, Emanuel, & Updegraff, 2012; 
Dickson, Ciesla, & Reilly, 2012; Gunthert, Cohen, Butler, & Beck, 2005; Puterman, Delongis, & 
Pomaki, 2010; Starr & Davila, 2012) in order to measure the intra-individual fluctuations of 
rumination within a day or a week.  Across studies, state rumination was found to be predictive 
of negative affect (Brans, Koval, Verduyn, & Lim, 2013; Brinker & Dozois, 2009; Dickson, 
Ciesla, & Reilly, 2012; Moberly & Watkins, 2008; Genet & Seimer, 2012; Puterman, Delongis, 
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& Pomaki, 2010; Takano & Tanno, 2011). Several studies also found that negative affect 
predicted state rumination (Brans, Koval, Verduyn, & Lim, 2013; Moberly & Watkins, 2008). 
The relationship between state rumination and negative affect is stronger in individuals who rate 
themselves high in trait rumination (Puterman, Delongis, & Pomaki, 2010). Experience sampling 
methodology has also allowed researchers to examine the diurnal shape of rumination change. 
Specifically, for individuals from a non-clinical population, rumination tends to have a U-shaped 
pattern with high points in the morning and evening (Moberly & Watkins, 2008; Takano & 
Tanno, 2011). In individuals who rate themselves as highly depressed, rumination tends to 
gradually increase throughout the day (Takano & Tanno, 2011). 
Relationship between self-concept clarity and rumination 
 Though self-focused attention has been thought to contribute to self-concept, few studies 
have examined the relationship between rumination and self-concept clarity. In a self-report 
study, roughly 25% of individuals who endorsed high amounts of rumination as a coping 
strategy said that they ruminated in order to understand themselves better (Watkins & Baracaia, 
2001). In a separate study, participants who engaged in a rumination induction rated themselves 
as having gained more self-insight than those who engaged in a distraction induction, suggesting 
that individuals view rumination as a means of learning about the self and perhaps gaining self-
clarity (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). However, cross-sectional research has found 
that trait rumination has a negative association with SCC (Boelen et al., 2012; Campbell et al., 
1996; Simsek, 2013). Despite individuals’ metacognitive beliefs about the benefits of 
rumination, self-report trait measures suggest that rumination may have a negative effect on self-
clarity or vice versa.  
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As of yet, no study has observed the causal relationship between rumination and SCC. 
Instead, we must look to related research literature on rumination. Several studies have linked 
rumination to types of uncertainty. For example, experimental studies have found that inducing 
rumination in dysphoric (Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999) and nondysphoric (Di 
Schiena, Luminet, Chang, & Philippot, 2013) individuals causes them to voice more uncertainty 
about their solutions to problems, reduces their decisional confidence following decision making, 
and increases the degree to which they perceive decision making as difficult (Lyubomirsky et al., 
1999; van Randenborgh, de Jong-Meyer, & Huffmeier, 2010). Correlational studies have also 
shown that trait ruminators tend to be more uncertain and less satisfied with their problem 
solving while frequently desiring more time to further consider solutions, and that trait 
ruminators display more decisional dissonance (De Los Reyes, Aldao, Kundey, Lee, & Molina, 
2012; Ward et al., 2003). Both trait and state rumination have therefore been linked to increases 
in uncertainty and decreases in confidence.   
While the research on rumination has not specifically studied self-confusion and 
uncertainty, it is reasonable to expect that ruminating about the self-concept may lead to lower 
certainty or confidence about the components of the self. It has been found that encouraging 
participants to think about why they are a certain way, rather than concretely about how they are, 
causes participant self-ratings to be less consistent and more in line with socially desirable 
responding, perhaps due to the higher cognitive load that more abstract “why” questions require 
(Hixon & Swann, 1993). Although this research was concerned with accuracy over time, it also 
suggests that ruminative self-questioning may cause discrepancies in how individuals view 
themselves, leading to a lower sense of temporal stability of the self.  
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Further perspective on the relationship between rumination and SCC can be gained from 
the developmental literature. When writing about identity formation, Luyckx et al., (2007, 2008) 
posited that discrepancies between the real and ideal self could spark ruminative exploration in 
which individuals continue to ask the same identity-focused questions without finding solutions 
or achieving identity commitment. In turn, people may feel more uncertain about themselves 
than they did initially. Studies have since found that ruminative exploration is positively 
associated with identity diffusion and negatively associated with identity commitment (Luyckx, 
Schwartz, Berzonsky, Soenens, Vansteenkiste, Smits, & Goossens, 2008). Although they 
describe different self-structures, self-concept clarity and identity commitment have been shown 
to have a positive reciprocal relationship (Schwartz et al., 2011). One could therefore surmise 
that the experience of uncontrollable and unproductive rumination could lead individuals to feel 
less certain about themselves, in turn reducing self-concept clarity.  
 The question of how self-clarity and self-knowledge is formed has guided psychology 
since early in the discipline’s inception (James, 1892). With more recent research suggesting that 
lower self-concept clarity is associated with several types of psychopathology, knowledge of the 
factors that influence self-clarity would have potential clinical benefits. The purpose of this 
research was to examine the effect of rumination on SCC. We predicted that engaging in a self-
focused ruminative task will lead to lower reported levels of SCC compared to engaging in a 
distraction task. Furthermore, we predicted that the effects of the task will be greater for 
individuals who were already experiencing some degree of self-confusion.   
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Method 
Participants 
Participants consisted of psychology undergraduate students recruited through the 
undergraduate research participant pool (URPP). Participants were offered one credit towards 
their final grade in an Introduction to Psychology course. A total of 245 individuals (76% 
female) completed the online demographic and trait surveys. Of this number, 192 individuals 
(80% female) participated in the laboratory portion of the study. As the laboratory portion is of 
particular interest, the remaining demographic information will be provided for those who 
participated in the laboratory portion. The age range of those who participated in the laboratory 
study ranged from 17 to 36 years old, with the average age being 19.64 years. See Table 1 for 
information on participant ethnicity.  
Materials 
Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS; Campbell et al, 1996). The SCCS is a 12-item measure of the 
amount to which self-concept is clearly defined, consistent, and stable. Respondents indicated 
how much they agreed or disagreed with each statement using a five-item scale (1= Strongly 
Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). Example items include, “My beliefs about myself often conflict 
with one another; reverse scored.” Initial studies of the SCCS have shown the average alpha 
reliability coefficient to be 0.86 (Campbell et al., 1996). We obtained a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85 
for the SCC scale, 95% CI [0.80, 0.90].   
Dialectical Self-Concept. The Dialectical Self Scale (DSS; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010) is a 
self-report measure of naive dialecticism.  The DSS has 32 items rated on a 7-point scale (1 = 
Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). Examples of items include “I often find that my beliefs 
and attitudes will change under different contexts.” Cronbach’s alphas across cultures have been 
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found to fall in the 0.69 to 0.87 range (Spencer-Rogers et al., 2009). We obtained a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.84 for the DSS, 95% CI [0.80, 0.88].  
State Self-Concept Clarity. State self-concept clarity was measured in two different formats. The 
first format (“twoQ SCC”) measured state SCC with two self-report items: “I have a clear sense 
of who and what I am” and “I am not really the person I appear to be.” Participants rated the 
extent to which they agreed with each statement on a 5-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = 
Strongly agree). Participants were instructed to respond to each item based on how they feel in 
the moment, even if it does not reflect how they generally feel. The items were selected from the 
Self-Concept Clarity Scale based on their face validity and their adaptability to present-moment 
experiences. Each item has also been shown to have relatively high factor loadings within the 
SCCS (Campbell et al., 1996). In a previous study on daily SCC, only the first item was used as 
a measure of state SCC (Schwartz et al., 2011). We wished to add an item in order to increase 
reliability of the state SCC measurements. We also successfully used this measure of state SCC 
in a previous study on daily fluctuations in SCC (Katz & Eastwood, manuscript in preparation). 
The two items were intermixed amidst three other unrelated items asking about the sharpness of 
sensations and thoughts, in keeping with the cover story. As the scale consisted of two items, the 
Spearman Brown coefficient was calculated for reliability (Eisinga, te Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 
2013). The two items had a Spearman Brown coefficient of 0.622.  
 The second format (“confidence SCC”) measured state SCC using a method developed 
by Campbell (1990) before the SCCS was developed. Based on Campbell’s protocol, participants 
were asked to rate themselves on 15 personality traits. They were then asked to indicate how 
confident they were in their ratings. As confidence in self-attributes is an aspect of SCC, we used 
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the confidence ratings as another means of measuring SCC. Cronbach’s alpha for the sample was 
0.84, 95% CI [0.79, 0.89]. 
State Rumination. The state rumination measurement was adapted from Takano and Tanno 
(2011). Participants were asked to briefly record their current thought. They were then asked to 
rate on 5-point scales whether the thought was about them or something else (1 = Not at all about 
me, 5 = Entirely about me), the extent to which the thought was intrusive (1 = Very intrusive, 5 = 
Not at all intrusive), and whether the thought was positive or negative (1 = Very Negative, 5 = 
Very positive).  
Procedure 
Participants were told that they were participating in a study examining the relationship 
between imagination and other personality variables. After providing their consent, they 
completed the SCCS online as part of a larger series of questionnaires. Participants then attended 
a laboratory session.  They sat in individual rooms. They provided their consent to engage in the 
research, and then were asked to engage in an “imagination exercise.” They were randomly 
assigned to the rumination or distraction induction condition. Each condition required the 
participants to focus on a series of statements for eight minutes (See Appendices A and B). In the 
rumination condition, the statements directed the participant’s focus to their physical sensations, 
emotions, and cognitions (e.g. “Think about trying to understand your feelings”). The distraction 
induction statements directed participants’ attention to objects other than themselves (e.g. “Think 
about a puddle in the middle of the sidewalk”). Both rumination and distraction induction 
statements were adapted from Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995). The statements 
differed from Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema’s inductions in that one rumination statement 
that seemed to directly focus attention on self-concept clarity was removed, and a distraction 
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statement was chosen at random and removed in order to maintain an equal number of 
statements in both inductions.  In each condition, the statements were on a series of PowerPoint 
slides that the participants could flip through at their own rate. Following the inductions, 
participants completed a manipulation check in which they responded to the state rumination 
measure. They then completed the two state SCC measures. Finally, participants reported what 
they believed the study was examining. Participants were then debriefed as to the purpose of the 
experiment.  
Results 
The principal investigator coded participant responses on their beliefs regarding the 
purpose of the experiments. Responses that indicated any kind of relationship between thinking 
about the self and self-knowledge or clarity were coded as seeing the true purpose of the 
experiment. Seven participants in total guessed the purpose of the experiment based on these 
criteria. In order to determine the effect of guessing correctly on the outcome of the study, twoQ 
SCC was regressed on to the manipulation condition and a variable representing whether or not 
participants guessed the true purpose of the study correctly (“guessing”). An interaction term 
between condition and “guessing” was added. A Wald test demonstrated that whether or not 
participants guessed the true purpose did not add significantly to the model, F(2, 183) = 0.814, p 
= 0.445. Therefore, the responses for the participants who guessed the experiment’s true purpose 
were included in all analysis.  
 See Table 2 for information on means and standard deviations of all variables.  
 A manipulation check was conducted in which state rumination following the manipulation 
was regressed on manipulation group. Participation in the rumination induction predicted a 1.90 
higher level of state rumination compared to participation in the distraction group, t(188) = 7.60, 
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p < 0.001. Therefore, the rumination induction appears to have led to higher levels of rumination 
than the distraction induction. Engagement was added to the model in order to see if it moderated 
the effect of the rumination manipulation on state rumination. In other words, did the amount to 
which participants reported engaging in the induction tasks moderate the amount to which the 
inductions led to rumination. Engagement did not significantly moderate the effect between 
rumination manipulation and state rumination, t(164) = -1.814, p = 0.07.
1
  
The relationship between the two measures of state SCC was explored. TwoQ SCC was 
significantly correlated with confidence SCC, r = 0.250, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.112, 0.378]. 
Responses on twoQ SCC measures were significantly correlated with trait SCC, r = 0.572, p < 
0.001, 95% CI [0.468, 0.660]. However, responses on confidence SCC were not significantly 
correlated with trait SCC, p = 0.124, 95% CI [-0.031, 0.250]. A regression of twoQ SCC on 
confidence SCC demonstrated that confidence SCC explained only 6% of the variance in twoQ 
SCC, (R
2
 = 0.063, F(1, 190) = 12.67, p < 0.001. As the two measures of state SCC did not seem 
to be equivalent, they were analyzed separately.  
 In order to determine the effect of the rumination manipulation on state SCC, twoQ SCC 
was regressed on manipulation group. A Cook’s Distance test indicated that no observations had 
a distance greater than 0.10, therefore no observation had a large amount of influence on the 
regression parameters. Manipulation group did not significantly predict level of state SCC in 
                                                 
1
 Of note, engagement was added as a variable after data from 20 participants had already been 
collected, thus we were unable to calculate the effects of engagement for the entire sample. 
Nevertheless, these results suggest that the rumination induction increased state rumination 
regardless of participants’ self-reported level of engagement in the manipulation.  
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participants, t(188) = -0.319, p = 0.75, 95% CI [-0.563, 0.406]. Manipulation group also did not 
predict confidence in self-reported personality traits using confidence SCC measures, t(188) = 
0.658, p = 0.511, 95% CI [-1.819, 3.64] . Thus, our hypothesis for a main effect of the 
rumination induction on SCC was not supported. 
To test our hypothesis that the rumination induction would affect individuals low in trait 
SCC to a larger extent than those high in trait SCC, twoQ SCC was regressed on manipulation 
condition and trait SCC, with an interaction term for manipulation and trait SCC. There was a 
significant interaction between trait SCC and manipulation condition, B = 0.063, t(185) = 2.491, 
p = 0.014. To further probe the interaction, an L matrix was created that included values of trait 
SCC at various percentiles. A Wald test indicated that for participants at the fifth percentile of 
trait SCC, the rumination condition resulted in a 1.047 decrease in state SCC level, t(185) = 
2.622, p = 0.009, 95% CI [ -1.836, -0.259]. For participants at the 25
th
 percentile of trait SCC, the 
rumination condition still resulted in lower state SCC levels than the distraction condition, B = -
0.515, t(185) = -2.148, p = 0.033, 95% CI [-0.987, -0.042]. However, for participants at the 50
th
 
percentile of trait SCC, there was no significant difference in state SCC following rumination 
versus distraction inductions, t(185) =  -1.006, p = 0.316, 95% CI [-0.596, 0.194]. The same 
could be said for participants at the 75
th
 percentile of trait SCC, t(185) = 0.708, p = 0.480, 95% 
CI [-0.312, 0.662]. Therefore, the rumination induction led to lower state SCC for participants 
with lower trait SCC, but not for those with higher trait SCC.  
The “confidence” measure of state SCC was not significantly predicted by manipulation 
(t(183) = 0.419, p = 0.675, 95% CI [0-9.786, 15.068]) or trait SCC (t(183) = 0.350, p = 0.727, 
95% CI [-0.467, 0.654]). Trait SCC did not significantly moderate the relationship between 
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manipulation condition and confidence scores (t(183) = -0.369, p = 0.713, 95% CI [-0.409, 
0.280]).  
Exploratory analysis was then conducted in which DSS was added as a variable to the 
regression equation. In the new equation, twoQ SCC was regressed on manipulation condition, 
trait SCC, and DSS score, with an interaction term for manipulation and trait SCC. Dialectical 
self-concept did not significantly predict changes in state SCC when controlling for all other 
variables, t(184) = -1.685, p = 0.0936, 95% CI [-0.024, 0.002].  
 
Discussion 
The results of this study failed to find evidence that rumination has a universal effect on 
self-concept clarity. Individuals who were low in trait SCC and were induced to ruminate 
showed a lower state SCC rating than individuals who were low in SCC and not induced to 
ruminate. However, the same was not true for individuals with medium or high levels of trait 
SCC. For individuals with low trait SCC, engaging in rumination may have increased their 
awareness of their lack of self-clarity. Previous research has shown that rumination can reduce 
some individuals’ sense of certainty (Nolen Hoeksema, 2000; Yook, Kim, Suh, & Lee, 
2010;Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Ward et al., 2003). If we assume that individuals with low SCC 
experience their lack of clarity as distressing or a problem, then ruminating about themselves 
might lead them to have a decreased confidence in their ability to know themselves clearly and 
an increased sense of uncertainty about their self-concept. Beyond drawing attention to pre-
existing low SCC, the act of ruminating may have further aggravated the self-confusion. In 
contrast, individuals with medium or high trait SCC who ruminated about themselves may have 
had their attention drawn to their strong self-clarity. As their self-clarity is not a problem or a 
  21 
 
frustrated goal, the act of ruminating would not have led to increased uncertainty or lack of 
confidence.  
There were no significant interactions when confidence in personality ratings was used as 
a measure of SCC. Perhaps this can be due to the wording of the personality and confidence 
items. The twoQ SCC items were carefully worded in order to measure state SCC: they asked the 
participants to rate themselves based on how they felt in the present moment, regardless of how 
they usually felt. In contrast, the personality traits and confidence questions were not worded to 
measure here-and-now judgments. They instead asked participants to simply rate themselves on 
the items and then rate their confidence in their responses. It is therefore very likely that 
participants were using their knowledge of their personality traits to respond to these items rather 
than their experiences in the present moment. These confidence ratings would therefore be less 
likely to be affected by a state rumination induction. One potential flaw in this explanation is that 
the confidence ratings were also not correlated with trait SCC. Perhaps confidence in personality 
trait ratings measures only a specific aspect of SCC. If self-concept clarity is the extent to which 
an individual’s self-beliefs are clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and stable, 
confidence in personality trait ratings only partially capture SCC as a concept. 
The results of this study have several interesting implications. The research literature on 
the effects of rumination on certainty has been limited to studies examining decisional 
dissonance or certainty in self-generated solutions. The decisions and problems that have been 
studied have concerned events and situations external to the individual. As of yet, no studies 
have examined the effect of rumination on certainty about the self-concept. Previous research has 
posited that rumination might be a maladaptive attempt to cope with uncertainty (de Jong-Meyer, 
Beck, & Riede, 2009; Liao & Wei, 2011). Combined with the existing literature on decisions and 
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problem solving, the results of this study suggest that ruminating on a topic can inadvertently 
increase the amount of uncertainty one experiences rather than the reverse. Individuals who 
ruminate in response to uncertainty about the self-concept may spark a ruminative cycle in which 
the rumination leads to further self-confusion, leading to further rumination.  
Additional knowledge about the mechanisms behind a sense of self-concept clarity can 
also guide attempts at increasing SCC. Since many Western cultures place a premium on a clear 
and stable sense of self (Peng & Nisbett, 1999), a low SCC may be a distressing experience for 
individuals within these cultures. Despite SCC being a culturally located phenomenon, low SCC 
has also been linked to psychological wellbeing in individuals in more dialectical cultures 
(Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang, & Hou, 2004), though the predictive ability of SCC in these 
cultures may be weaker (Campbell, 1996; Suh, 2002). Therefore, for individuals who accept that 
a high SCC is of value, increasing SCC may influence their sense of wellbeing. Several 
interventions exist for reducing rumination (e.g. Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2013); it is 
possible that these interventions may also be a means of increasing SCC, or at least prevent 
further reductions in self-clarity.  
There are several limitations to this study. State SCC was not measured prior to the 
rumination or distraction manipulations. We chose not to measure state SCC before the 
manipulation as an attempt to minimize the likelihood that participants guess the true purpose of 
the study. Though we were able to compare state SCC between manipulation groups, we were 
unable to analyze change in state SCC caused by the rumination induction. As well, we only 
tested the effect of state rumination on state SCC and not the reverse; it is possible that the two 
variables have a reciprocal relationship that was not captured in this research. Indeed, a separate 
study using Granger Causality Analysis on experience sampling data has suggested that when 
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occurring naturally, fluctuations in SCC temporally precede changes in state rumination (Katz & 
Eastwood, manuscript in preparation). Finally, this study’s sample consisted of undergraduate 
students, thus potentially limiting the generalizability of these findings. The effect of rumination 
on SCC may differ for those of older ages that were not captured in our sample, or for 
individuals from clinical populations.  
The findings from this study point to interesting future directions in research. First, 
researchers can test whether manipulating SCC influences the degree to which individuals 
ruminate. Such a study would help us understand the nature of the relationship between SCC and 
rumination, whether it is unidirectional or reciprocal. Applying the study to a clinical sample 
would also further elucidate the effect of rumination on SCC. For example, does rumination in 
individuals with depression have a larger effect on SCC than rumination in individuals without 
depression? Alternately, future research can include a larger range of ages. Young adulthood is a 
time in which identity and self-concept is explored (Arnett, 2007; Gore & Cross, 2014). It is 
possible that SCC is less reactive to rumination in individuals of older ages.  Lastly, studies can 
further delineate whether the nature of self-focused attention affects SCC. For example, if the 
rumination induction was preceded by instructions on how to mindfully and nonjudgmentally 
direct attention to the self, would individuals with low trait SCC still experience a decrease in 
state SCC? The results of such a study would have implications for clinical interventions, 
particularly if the study included participants from a clinical sample.  
Conclusion 
Self-examination has a history of being viewed as a process towards achieving self-
knowledge (e.g., Foucault, 1988). However, the relationship between self-focused thought and 
self-clarity may be more complex than initially believed. Individuals who ruminate often believe 
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that it is a helpful coping strategy, and rumination has been thought to be a response to 
intolerance of uncertainty. Despite these beliefs, the results of this study suggest that self-focused 
rumination can lead to increased self-confusion in individuals who were already low in self-
concept clarity. Rather than solve the self-confusion, rumination appears to aggravate uncertainty 
about the self-concept.  
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The Relationship between Self-Concept Clarity and Rumination: An Experience Sampling 
Study 
The definition, composition, and structure of the self have long been a focus of 
psychological inquiry (Baumeister, 1987). Since the early days of the discipline (James, 1890), 
psychologists have sought to describe how the self is organized and how the individual 
experiences the self. Based on current understanding, the self-concept is a multifaceted and 
dynamic phenomenon that influences information processing, motivation, and behaviour 
(Markus & Wurf, 1984). Significant amounts of research have focused on the content of the self-
concept: is the content an accurate reflection of the self, is it accessible, is it evaluated as positive 
or negative? Compared to the content of the self-concept, the structure of the self-concept has 
received less attention. Self-concept structure refers to the clarity and consistency of self-
attributes (Campbell, Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavalee, & Lehman, 1996).  It is the self-concept 
structure that provides individuals with a sense of clarity about themselves and the perception of 
consistency within their self-concept and stability over time. Factors that may increase or 
decrease self-structure coherence are of great interest, as low amounts of self-concept coherence, 
consistency, and clarity have been linked to negative psychological outcomes (Campbell, 
Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavalee, & Lehman, 1996). Beyond clinical research, information on the 
factors that influence self-concept structure would provide insight into how individuals gain a 
sense of clarity and continuity of self.  
 Self-representations that compose the self-concept are thought to arise partly through 
self-reflection, self-monitoring, and interactions with others (Markus & Wurf, 1984). However, 
the relationship between self-focused attention and the perceived clarity of the self-concept is 
unclear; increased self-focused thinking may consolidate individuals’ sense of self, or it may 
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alert individuals to inconsistencies across their different self-representations, thus decreasing the 
amount to which they believe they clearly know themselves. Equally, as the self-concept in part 
motivates behaviour, the degree to which individuals believe they clearly perceive themselves 
might influence the amount to which they engage in self-focused attention. The purpose of our 
research is to determine the relationship between one particular type of self-focused thought, 
namely rumination, and the clarity, confidence, and consistency with which individuals view 
their self-attributes. This research will in turn help us understand the pathways to self-clarity, and 
the effects of self-clarity on the way in which we engage in self-focused thought.   
The Influence of SCC on Rumination  
There are several reasons to predict that rumination may influence SCC (see Paper 1). Of 
course, the relationship between rumination and SCC may also be reciprocal. The influence of 
SCC on rumination may be deduced if we return to the original definitions of the variables. 
According to the self-regulation or goal-discrepancy theories (Martin & Tesser, 1996), 
rumination occurs when individuals becomes aware of unexpected progress towards their goals. 
Rumination on the goal will then continue until the individuals achieve their goals or are 
distracted.  Negative rumination occurs when there is a negative discrepancy between a person’s 
ideal self and actual self.  Rumination can become additionally maladaptive when the ruminative 
thoughts are abstract rather than concrete, as they would be less likely to lead to problem solving 
(Watkins, 2008). By impeding problem solving, abstract ruminative thoughts might therefore 
decrease the chance of goal attainment, leading to further rumination.  Given that in Western 
culture a unitary, coherent, and stable sense of self is prized (Peng & Nisbett, 1999), one could 
expect that individuals who are aware of this emphasis on self-clarity but perceive a lack of 
clarity in themselves would be led to ruminate on this goal discrepancy. As determining a sense 
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of self-clarity involves higher order, abstract self-evaluations, one could further predict that the 
self-focused rumination would be unproductive and lead to further negative repetitive thought. 
Low self-concept clarity combined with an awareness of the cultural importance placed on self-
clarity and adoption of self-clarity as a goal could then lead to increased self-focused rumination.  
 The directional relationship from SCC to rumination is also supported by research on 
rumination and intolerance of uncertainty. Individuals who are intolerant of uncertainty perceive 
the state of uncertainty as a highly distressing experience that they must ameliorate or avoid. 
Traditionally, intolerance of uncertainty has been linked to worry and anxiety disorders (e.g. 
Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004; Holaway, Heinberg, & Coles, 2006). However, research 
suggests that rumination may be another maladaptive coping strategy in response to distressing 
uncertainty (de Jong-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009; Liao & Wei, 2011). Studies have found a 
correlation between intolerance of uncertainty and rumination (de Jong-Meyer et al., 2009; Liao 
& Wei, 2011; Yook, Kim, Suh, & Lee, 2010). Though this research is correlational, one could 
surmise that the rumination is a response to the experience of uncertainty. Rumination may 
therefore be a maladaptive coping strategy to the distressing experience of uncertainty about the 
self.  
Further elucidation on the potential causal relationship between SCC and rumination can 
be found in the self-affirmation literature. Self-affirmation theory states that people are 
motivated to maintain a sense of self-integrity. When an aspect of the self is threatened, people 
may respond to the threat by self-affirming, meaning that they focus on a separate aspect of the 
self that restores the sense of integrity (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). If rumination is instigated by a 
perceived discrepancy between the actual self and ideal self, self-affirmation can potentially end 
rumination by making other aspects of the self salient that are closer to the ideal self. Indeed, 
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studies have found that self-affirmation leads to less rumination following failure (Koole, 
Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999). Self-concept clarity and self-affirmation are 
separate concepts; a self-affirmation is a behaviour whereas self-concept clarity is an evaluation 
of the structure of the self. However, SCC has been theorized to be a mechanism behind the 
effects of self-affirmations (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). It is possible that strong SCC allows for 
greater ease in self-affirmation as alternate aspects of the self are clearer and readily accessible 
(Bechtoldt, De Dreu, Nijstad,& Zapf, 2010). In turn, the self-affirmation reduces the likelihood 
of rumination as the goal discrepancy becomes less salient when the focus is shifted to other self-
aspects.   
Measurement 
One of the difficulties with describing the relationship between rumination and SCC is 
that they have been mainly studied together as personality traits in cross-sectional research. 
Though this research has suggested correlation between the variables, it cannot describe their 
temporal progression over time. Furthermore, much of the previous research on SCC has taken 
place in laboratory environments. The drawback of a laboratory setting is that it prevents 
researchers from analyzing participants’ subjective experiences in their everyday lives. One 
potential solution to these difficulties would be to use experience sampling methodology (ESM; 
Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007). In ESM, 
participants receive multiple signals over the course of a study period. Based on the purpose and 
variables being studied, study periods can vary from one day to several weeks or months 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007). Upon 
receiving each signal, participants respond to a series of items that measure the variables of 
interest. The benefit of using ESM is that it collects data while participants are in their natural 
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environments rather than in a laboratory setting (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Hektner, 
Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007). Further, as the data are gathered at multiple points over 
time, researchers using ESM are able to study longitudinal relationships between variables.  The 
use of ESM would therefore allow us to study the relationship between rumination and SCC as it 
unfolds naturally over time.  
The Present Research 
 The purpose of the present research was to examine the temporal progression of SCC and 
rumination as participants enact their everyday lives. We predicted a negative relationship 
between rumination and SCC at both the between-subjects and within-subjects level. That is, for 
each participant at any one time there would be negative association between SCC and 
rumination. As well, when aggregated across times, participants with higher SCC would have 
lower rumination. Furthermore, we predicted a feedback relationship between rumination and 
SCC, such that changes in SCC would predict later changes in rumination and vice versa. Two 
studies were conducted. The first was a pilot study in order to test the feasibility of the methods 
and provide a basis for power analysis. The second was a larger scale ESM study in which 
participants provided twice-daily measurements of rumination and SCC for 28 days.   
Study 1: Daily Measurement Pilot 
Purpose 
  The purpose of Study 1 was to test the feasibility of using experience sampling 
methodology (ESM; Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007) in order to examine the 
relationship between rumination and self-concept clarity over time. Results from the pilot were 
used for power analysis in order to determine the number of participants needed for a larger scale 
study.  
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Method 
 Participants 
 Participants were first recruited through the Undergraduate Research Participants Pool 
(URPP) associated with the Introduction to Psychology course at York University. Students in 
the Introduction to Psychology course have the option of participating in three hours of 
psychology research or completing an essay in return for course credit. Participants completed an 
online survey that included personality trait measurements. At the end of the survey, an 
announcement appeared that invited participants to participate in a second study and included a 
link to the recruitment page. However, only three participants signed up after finishing the online 
survey. We therefore shifted recruitment methods, and recruited through posters and class 
announcements. Participants were required to own smartphones with Internet access. Nine 
participants in total were recruited, of whom eight completed the daily surveys (50% female, 
average age = 21.875). As incentive for completing the study, for each questionnaire participants 
completed in the first two weeks of data collection they had a ballot entered into a draw for a 
$200 gift certificate to the York University Bookstore. For each ballot participants completed 
over the entire four weeks of data collection they had a ballot entered into a draw for a $1000 gift 
certificate to the York University Bookstore.  
 Daily Measures 
 State Rumination. The measurement of state rumination was adapted from Takano and 
Tanno (2011). Participants were asked to briefly record their current thought. They were then 
asked to rate on a 5-point scale whether the thought was about them or something else (1 = Not 
at all about me, 5 = Entirely about me), the extent to which the thought was intrusive (1 = Very 
  31 
 
intrusive, 5 = Not at all intrusive), and whether the thought was positive or negative (1 = Very 
Negative, 5 = Very positive).  
 State Self-Concept Clarity. State self-concept clarity was measured with two items: “I 
have a clear sense of who and what I am” and “I am not really the person I appear to be.” 
Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with each statement on a 5-point scale (1 = 
Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree). Participants were instructed to respond to each item based 
on how they feel in the moment, even if it does not reflect how they generally feel. The items 
were selected from the Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS; Campbell et al., 1996) based on their 
face validity and their adaptability to present-moment experiences. Each item has also been 
shown to have relatively high factor loadings within the SCCS (Campbell et al., 1996). In a 
previous study on daily SCC, only the first item was used as a measure of state SCC (Schwartz et 
al., 2011). We wished to add an item in order to increase reliability of the state SCC 
measurements.  
 Adaptation of the Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989). The Affect Grid is 
a single-item measure in the form of a 9x9 grid that measures current pleasure/displeasure and 
arousal/sleepiness. Said to measure “core affect,” the Affect Grid is suitable for multiple daily 
measurements: unlike distinct emotions such as anger or happiness, core emotion is present and 
fluctuating throughout the day. Convergent validity for the affect grid has been found through 
comparisons with other frequently used affect measures, such as the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule and the Profile of Mood States (Kilgore, 1998). Due to the limitations of 
smartphone technology, as opposed to using a single-item Affect Grid, we deconstructed the grid 
into its two component concepts, pleasure and arousal. Participants used a 9-point scale in order 
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to indicate the extent to which they were experiencing high or low arousal, and the extent to 
which they were feeling pleasant or unpleasant.  
 Social Interaction. Social interaction was measured with a Yes/No item asking 
participants if they were engaging in a social interaction at the time they were signaled.  
Rumination Subscale of the Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999). The RRQ consists of two 12-item questionnaires measuring trait rumination 
and reflection. Respondents indicated how much they agreed or disagreed with each statement 
using a five-item scale (1= Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). The Rumination scale is 
designed to capture a tendency to self-focus that is motivated by perceptions of threat, loss, or 
injustice. Example items of the Rumination scale include, “Sometimes it is hard for me to shut 
off thoughts about myself.” The rumination subscale of the RRQ has been shown to have an 
alpha reliability coefficient equal to 0.90 (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).  
Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS; Campbell et al., 1996). The SCCS is a 12-item 
measure of the amount to which self-concept is clearly defined, consistent, and stable. 
Respondents indicated how much they agreed or disagreed with each statement using a five-item 
scale (1= Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). Example items include, “My beliefs about 
myself often conflict with one another; reverse scored).” Initial studies of the SCCS have shown 
the average alpha reliability coefficient to be 0.86 (Campbell et al., 1996).  
 Procedure 
 Participants attended orientation sessions in order to learn about the study and consent to 
participate. Each orientation session had between one and three participants attend. During the 
orientation session, the consent form was explained in full to each participant. As well, the daily 
survey items were reviewed, and examples were provided in order to elucidate each item. 
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Participants then answered the trait questionnaires. Individuals who consented to participate 
registered for the study with the online program SurveySignal (Hofmann & Patel, 2013). Signals 
for surveys were scheduled to take place at random times within a specific two-hour time range 
in the morning, and again within a specific two hour time range in the evening. Participants were 
given four options of two-hour time ranges in the morning and evening, and were encouraged to 
pick the time range that would best fit their schedules. Participants then provided SurveySignal 
with the number for their smartphones (the number was then encrypted from the researcher). 
Upon registering, participants received a text message from SurveySignal to ensure that the 
number given was correct. The day after their registration, participants began to receive a single 
text message at a random time within the morning and evening time ranges specified. The text 
message included a link to the online survey. The survey used the online platform Qualtrics 
(Qualtrics, 2013). Participants answered the survey using their smartphones. Each participant 
answered twice-daily surveys for 28 days. On the final day, participants again completed a 
survey containing the RRQ and SCCS.  
Results of Power Analysis 
 Analysis was conducted using R (R Core Team, 2013). The packages Spida (Monette, 
2012) and NLME (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Development Core Team, 2012) were 
used for the power simulation. The date and time information from each questionnaire was 
converted to number of seconds from a set point. The variables of thought valence, thought 
direction, and thought intrusiveness were combined to create one rumination variable such that 
negative, intrusive thoughts about the self would result in high rumination. The SCC item “I am 
not really the person I appear to be” was reversed, and the two SCC items were combined to 
create an SCC variable. The intraclass correlation coefficients on ranks of variables for 
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rumination and SCC were sufficiently large to suggest that multilevel modeling was necessary 
(ranked ICC = 0.202, ranked ICC = 0.619 respectively). In order to obtain standard deviations 
and approximations of expected effect sizes, a model was created in which SCC was regressed 
on rumination within and between individuals. The within-individual SCC standard deviation 
was 1.5, and the between-individuals SCC standard deviation was 1.7. The within-individual 
rumination standard deviation was 2.5, and the between individual rumination variable was 0.7. 
The intercept used was 0, and as a starting point, the within and between person effect sizes were 
0.5. A power simulation was created using a multilevel model in which a generated y variable 
was regressed on a generated x variable using the standard deviations obtained from the previous 
regression. Each simulation used 1000 iterations of the generated model. The sample size and 
effect sizes were manipulated in order to ascertain an appropriate sample size for the study (see 
Tables 4 to 11). Based on the power analysis, a sample size of at least 30 participants was 
determined to be sufficient to reduce the likelihood of type 2 error below 0.5% with within 
participant and between participant effect sizes of at least 0.3.  
Study 2 
Purpose 
The purpose of Study 2 was to examine the relationship between SCC and rumination 
over time in a larger sample. The second purpose was to examine the effect of dialectical self-
concept on the relationship between rumination and self-concept clarity. We predicted that SCC 
and rumination will have a reciprocal, negative association, such that higher levels of SCC will 
predict lower rumination and vice versa. We predicted that the negative relationship between 
rumination and SCC would be true both within individuals and between individuals. As well, 
based on findings from previous laboratory-based research (Katz & Eastwood, manuscript in 
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preparation), the relationship between experimentally-induced rumination and state SCC was 
moderated by trait SCC. Therefore, we predicted that rumination will be a stronger predictor of 
changes in state SCC for participants low in trait SCC. Finally, we predicted that self-concept 
clarity would be lower in individuals with high amounts of naive dialecticism.  
Method 
 Participants 
Participants were recruited using two methods. The first method was identical to the more 
successful recruitment and reward method of Study 1, in that announcements were made in 
various psychology classes and posters were hung in the psychology building on York 
University Campus. A total of eight further participants were recruited using this method (62.5% 
female, average age = 20.5). The second method recruited participants from the Undergraduate 
Research Participants Pool at York University. Each student had access to a course website that 
contained a list of recruiting experiments. Students could then use the website to sign up for 
different studies. To recruit students, we placed a description of this study on the website. 
Students who participated received three course credits towards their final grade. The description 
informed students that they needed a smartphone with Internet access in order to participate. A 
total of 30 participants were recruited using this method (70% female, average age = 20.00).  
 Daily Measures 
The daily measures were identical to those used in Study 1. 
 Trait Measures 
Dialectical Self-Concept. The Dialectical Self Scale (DSS; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010) 
is a self-report measure of Naive Dialecticism.  The DSS has 32 items rated on a 7-point scale (1 
= Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). Examples of items include “I often find that my 
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beliefs and attitudes will change under different contexts.” Cronbach’s alphas across cultures 
have been found to fall in the 0.69 to 0.87 range (Spencer-Rogers et al., 2009). 
 Rumination Subscale of the Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999).  
Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS; Campbell et al, 1996).  
 Procedure 
 For participants recruited through posters and class announcements, procedure was 
identical to that of Study 2. Participants recruited through the Introduction to Psychology 
Course’s research website attended two laboratory sessions. During the first session, participants 
provided verbal and written consent to participate in the study. The study methods were then 
explained to the participants, and each item from the daily measures questionnaire was reviewed. 
Participants then completed the trait measures, and signed up with SurveySignal in order to 
receive the twice-daily text messages that linked to the daily questionnaire. After four weeks, 
participants in the URPP participant pool returned to the laboratory in order to complete the final 
survey.    
Data Analysis 
 Multilevel longitudinal analysis was conducted in order to examine the relationship 
between state SCC and state rumination over time (Verbeke & Molenberghs, 2009; Snijders & 
Bosker, 2012). The NLME package (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, D., & R Development 
Core Team, 2012) was used within R (R Development Core Team, 2012) for all model building 
and regression analyses.  
 Granger Causality Analysis was used to examine the temporal progression of SCC and 
rumination (Granger, 1969). Granger causality remains one of the most consistently used 
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approaches to causal relations between time series (von Eye, Wiedermann, & Mun, 2014). The 
basis for Granger Causality is that the effect of a variable cannot precede the cause (Lutkepohl, 
2005). Granger Causality interprets variable xt as “causing” variable yt if the inclusion of former 
predicts the latter over and above variable yt’s ability to predict itself (Granger, 1969). If the 
prediction of variable xt is also improved with the inclusion of variable yt , then the relationship 
between the variables are said to have a feedback relationship (Granger, 1969). If the “causal” 
relationship is limited to time points in the present such that yt predicts xt over and above xt’s 
ability to predict itself but yt-1 does not, then yt is said to have an instantaneous causal effect on 
variable xt (Granger, 1969).  
 To help describe his approach, Granger provided the following models: 
𝑥𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑎𝑗𝑥𝑡−𝑗 +
𝑚
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑏𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑗 +  𝜀𝑡 
𝑦𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑥𝑡−𝑗 +
𝑚
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑑𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑗 +  𝜂𝑡 
Where where 𝜀𝑡  and 𝜂𝑡 are uncorrelated white noise series, and m is a finite number shorter than 
the given times series. According to Granger Causality, Xt would “cause” Yt if cj does not equal 
zero, and Yt would cause Xt if bj does not equal zero. If both cj and bj do not equal zero, then it 
would be a feedback relationship. The instantaneous model would be as follows: 
𝑥𝑡  =  ∑ 𝑎𝑗𝑥𝑡−𝑗 +
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑏0𝑦𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑗 +  𝜀𝑡 
𝑦𝑡  =  ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑥𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑐0𝑥𝑡 +
𝑚
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑑𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑗 +  𝜂𝑡 
 As it is predicated on the notion that cause temporally precedes effect, Granger Causality is 
perhaps at its most persuasive when the relationship is not merely instantaneous, but rather when 
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past values of one variable predict present values of the second over and above the second 
variable’s ability to predict itself.  
Results 
Data from participants in Study 1a was added to the total data, resulting in fifteen 
individuals recruited for the draw-based study and 30 recruited for the course-credit based study. 
Participants in the course-credit based study did not significantly differ from those recruited in 
the draw-based study in terms of gender, t(31.05) = -0.747, p = 0.4606, 95% CI [-0.417, 0.193], 
or age, t(39.83) = 1.160, p = 0.253, 95% CI [ -0.655, 2.420]. Due to an error in the SurveySignal 
software, one participant was signaled five times within an hour on his first day of data 
collection and then withdrew from the study. His results were therefore removed from the final 
analysis. The final number of participants in the analysis was therefore 44 (70.4% female). Age 
of participants ranged from 17 – 29 years old, M = 20.17, SD = 2.51. Participants from the draw-
based group responded to on average 41.13 surveys, while participants in the credit-based group 
responded to 37.66 surveys. The difference in response rates was not significant, t(29.30) = 1.05, 
p = 0.30, 95% CI [-3.28, 10.23]. The draw-based and credit-based groups were combined for 
further analysis. Of note, a small number of participants in both groups responded to the same 
survey multiple times without being signaled, perhaps in a mistaken attempt to boost the number 
of draw ballots or credits they could receive. In these cases, only the data from surveys that 
responded directly to a signal were included in the analysis. Furthermore, results from all surveys 
that were completed more than 30 minutes after signal time were removed from the data (44 
surveys, or roughly 2.6% of total surveys answered). This resulted in a total of 1645 completed 
surveys. 
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Trait Measures 
Based on the trait measures taken using the SCCS and RRQ before the daily surveys 
began, there was a significant negative correlation between trait SCC and trait rumination 
between participants, r = -0.507, p = 0.007, 95% CI [-0.743, -0.157]. Due to an error with the 
signaling software, we were only able to obtain data on the final survey (the 28
th
 survey that 
included the RRQ and SCCS) for 26 participants. For those participants, there was no significant 
change in trait rumination, t(26) = -1.209, p = 0.238, 95% CI[-2.801, 0.727],  or trait SCC, t(26) 
= -1.683, p = 0.104, 95% CI[-3.538, 0.352] from before to after participation in the ESM study. 
Participation in the study did not appear to affect trait measures. See Table 3 for means and 
standard deviations of trait measures. 
Model Creation 
 In order to examine the instantaneous relationship between state SCC and state rumination, 
a multilevel model was created in which state rumination was first regressed on state SCC. A 
“time” variable was added in order to control for time since the first survey was administered for 
each participant. A contextual variable was added in order to represent possible difference 
between the SCC-rumination relationship at the within-person and between-person levels. 
Variables with random effects (i.e. the effect of the variable is modeled as varying randomly 
from participant to participant) included intercept and “time.” A non-parametric smoothing 
spline with 28 knots was also added as a variable with random effects in order to control for 
general trend over time. When compared to a model that did not allow for the relationship 
between the variables over time to differ between participants (i.e. “time” as a variable with 
random effects), a likelihood ratio test demonstrated a significant difference between the models 
(p < 0.001), and the AIC suggested that the model with “time” as a variable with random effects 
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was the better fit compared to the model without “time” as a variable with random effects 
(7338.701 and 7355.318 respectively). An AR(1) term was added to the model in order to 
account for autoregression within the error term of the model.  A likelihood ratio test suggested 
that the model with an AR(1) did not differ significantly from the model that excluded the AR(1) 
term, p = 0.5854. An AIC comparison indicated that a model including the AR(1) term 
(7340.403) was a worse fit than a model without the AR(1) term (7338.701). The AR(1) term 
was subsequently dropped. An unconditional model was tested in which intra-individual slope 
was added to intercept as a random factor. This model did not differ significantly from the 
random intercepts model, p = 0.323, and an AIC comparison indicated that the random intercepts 
model was a better fit for the data than an unconditional model (AIC = 6871.556  and AIC = 
6875.019 respectively). The random intercepts model was therefore used for all future analysis.  
Regression Without Lags 
 Within individuals, clarity significantly predicted rumination such that a single unit 
increase in clarity predicted a 0.36 decrease in rumination, t(1629) = -7.12, p < 0.001, 95% CI [-
0.46, -0.27]. This result remained significant when controlling for gender, mood valence, trait 
SCC, trait rumination, and engagement in social interaction. The contextual variable suggested a 
“contextual effect” of the clarity variable beyond the within-person effect. Indeed, there was a 
significant difference in the relationship between SCC and rumination within individuals, and the 
relationship between SCC and rumination between individuals, t(42) = 4.24, p < 0.001, 95% CI 
[0.34, 0.96]. When examining the effect of SCC on rumination between individuals, the variables 
had a positive relationship that approached significance, B = 0.29, t(42) = 1.90, p = 0.05, 95% CI 
[0.00, 0.58], thus creating an example of Robinson’s Paradox (Kievit, 2013). Therefore, 
adjusting for linear effects of time since sampling began and non-linear slow moving changes in 
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the variables, at any one time increases in SCC predict decreases in rumination. However, 
individuals who across time tend to be higher in SCC also show a trend towards being higher in 
rumination.  
 In order to test our hypothesis that a greater degree of dialectical self as measured by the 
DSS would predict lower SCC, SCC was regressed on trait DSS in a random intercepts 
multilevel model. A non-parametric smoothing spline with 28 knots was included as a variable 
with random effects in the model in order to adjust for the possible effects of slow trends in the 
variables over time. Time was also included as a variable with random effects.  Responses on the 
DSS did not significantly predict state SCC, p = 0.834. Our hypothesis that higher scores on the 
DSS would be linked to lower SCC was not supported.  
Analysis of Lagged Effects 
 Rumination Regressed on Clarity. In order to determine if lagged clarity predicted 
present rumination over and above the contribution of past values of rumination, rumination was 
regressed on lagged and instantaneous values of rumination and clarity. The initial model had 
three lags of clarity and three lags of rumination. Rumination was also regressed on the “time” 
variable in order to control for the effect of time when examining the relationship between 
rumination and clarity. In terms of random effects, a random intercept model was used. A non-
parametric smoothing spline with 28 knots was included as a variable with random effects in the 
model in order to adjust for the possible effect of slow trends in the variables over time. We 
assume that these slow trends are due to confounding factors and include the spline in order to 
control for these slow trends when examining the lagged relationship between clarity and 
rumination. The variable “time” was also included as a variable with random effects in order to 
adjust for possible differences between participants in the linear relationship between rumination 
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and time. Finally, the model included a continuous AR(1) term in the error term in order to 
account for additional autocorrelation in the error term.  
 In order to reach a satisfactory final model, we examined whether the continuous AR term, 
the inclusion of time as a variable with random effects, and each lag of rumination and clarity 
significantly contributed to the model. In terms of the lags, a Wald test indicated that clarity at 
lags of 2 and 3 and rumination at a lag of 3 did not significantly add to the model, F(3, 635) = 
0.867, p = 0.458. Clarity at lags 2 and 3 and rumination at lag 3 were subsequently dropped from 
the model.  
 Using the new model, a likelihood ratio test comparing the new model with and without the 
continuous AR indicated no significant difference between the models, p = 0.874 and AIC 
comparisons indicated the model without a continuous AR(1) term was a better fit than the 
model with AR (AIC = 3114.753, 3116.728 respectively), so the continuous AR term was 
subsequently dropped from the model. As well, a likelihood ratio test indicated that the models 
with and without “time” included as a variable with random effects did not differ significantly, p 
= 0.192, and the AIC values indicated that the model without time as a variable with random 
effects was a better fit (AIC = 3991.482 vs AIC = 3992.177). Time was therefore not included as 
a variable with random effects. 
 The final model therefore regressed rumination on instantaneous rumination and clarity, as 
well as on clarity at a lag of one, rumination at lags one and two, and “time.” Variables with 
random effects included the smoothing spline.  
 Controlling for lagged rumination, instantaneous clarity significantly predicted rumination, 
such that a one point increase in clarity predicted a 0.423 point decrease in rumination, t(898) = -
6.263, p < 0.001. Clarity at a lag of one also predicted rumination when controlling for lagged 
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rumination and instantaneous clarity, such that a one point increase in clarity predicted a later 
0.204 increase in rumination, t(898) = 2.935, p = 0.003. Together, these results suggest that a 
decrease in clarity from one time point to the next would result in higher rumination than if 
clarity had stayed constant. Equally, an increase in clarity from one time point to the next would 
predict lower rumination than if clarity had remained constant.    
 Clarity Regressed on Rumination. In order to determine if lagged rumination predicted 
clarity over and above lagged values of clarity, instantaneous clarity was regressed on lagged 
clarity, instantaneous rumination, and lagged rumination. A random intercept multilevel model 
was used. Once again, the initial model contained three lags of clarity and three lags of 
rumination, as well as “time” as a variable with fixed effects. Variables with random effects 
included rumination, “time” and a smoothing spline with 28 knots. Lastly, a continuous AR(1) 
term was again added in the error term.  
 A Wald test indicated that rumination at lags 1, 2, and 3 do not significantly add to the 
model, F(3, 635) = 1.515, p = 0.209. The lagged rumination variables were therefore removed 
from the model. A subsequent Wald test indicated that clarity at a lag of 3 did not significantly 
add to the model, F(1, 642) = 3.382, p = 0.06. Clarity at a lag of 3 was therefore removed from 
the model. Using the new model, a likelihood ratio test comparing the new model with and 
without the continuous AR term indicated no significant difference between the models, χ2 = 
1.477, p = 0.224. A likelihood ratio test demonstrated that the models with and without “time” 
included as a variable with random effects did not differ significantly, p = 0.1021. Time was 
therefore not included as a variable with random effects. 
 The final model therefore regressed clarity on instantaneous rumination, clarity at lags of 1 
and 2, and time. Variables with random effects included the smoothing spline.  
  44 
 
Instantaneous rumination significantly predicted clarity within individuals controlling for 
all other variables, such that a one point increase in rumination predicted a 0.103 point decrease 
in clarity, t(840) = -6.254, p < 0.001.  
Addition of Trait SCC 
 For the instantaneous model, state SCC was regressed on the “time” variable, state 
rumination and trait SCC. An interaction term was added between state rumination and trait 
SCC. The smoothing spline, intercept, and “time” were added as variables with random effects. 
The interaction between state rumination and trait SCC was significant, B = 0.02, t(1488) = 
2.990, p = 0.003. Three subsequent regression analyses were used with trait SCC centred around 
the values 31, 35.5 and 41, representing the first quartile, median, and third quartile scores. All 
three regression analyses showed a significant, negative relationship between state rumination 
and state SCC at low (B = -0.118, t(1488) = -8.532, p < 0.001), medium (B = -0.080, t(1488) = -
6.729, p < 0.001), and high (B = -0.033, t(1532) = -2.141, p = 0.032) levels of trait SCC. The 
effect seemed to be stronger at lower levels of trait SCC. Our hypothesis of a stronger negative 
relationship between state rumination and state SCC in individuals low in trait SCC was 
therefore supported at the instantaneous level.  
 Next, a lagged model was created in order to see if the predictive power of lagged 
rumination was moderated by trait SCC. State SCC was regressed on state rumination, 
rumination at a lag of one, state SCC at a lag of one, the “time” variable, and trait SCC. An 
interaction term was added between state rumination at a lag of one and trait SCC. A smoothing 
spline and the intercept were added as variables with random effects. A likelihood ratio test 
indicated a significant difference between a model with a continuous AR(1) model versus a 
model without a continuous AR(1) model, χ2 = 15.573, p < 0.001. An AIC comparison indicated 
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that the model with the continuous AR(1) was a better fit than the model without it (AIC = 
3215.634, AIC = 3229.209 respectively). The AR(1) model was therefore retained. The 
interaction between state SCC and lagged rumination was not significant, B = 0.002, t(1042) = 
1.157, p = 0.247. In other words, while trait SCC moderates the instantaneous relationship 
between state rumination and state SCC, state rumination does not predict later changes in state 
SCC after controlling for all other variables, and trait SCC does not moderate this relationship.   
Discussion 
 The results of Study 2 suggest that within individuals, decreases in clarity predict higher 
levels of rumination. This supports our hypothesis of a negative relationship between the 
variables at the within-person level. However, between individuals there is a trend towards a 
positive relationship between clarity and rumination. The results therefore fail to support our 
hypothesis that the negative relationship between SCC and rumination would persist when 
aggregated across time points. One potential reason for these results could be that individuals 
with low SCC may avoid thinking about themselves in general. Previous research has linked low 
trait SCC to passive, avoidant coping strategies (Smith, 1996, 2006). While typically rumination 
is seen as a passive coping strategy associated with avoidance (Moulds, Kandris, Starr, & Wong, 
2007; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003) when the issue at hand is confusion about the self then highly 
avoidant individuals may not think about themselves at all, and thus report on average lower 
rumination levels.  
 Another potential explanation for these results can be found in Watkins (2008) ECT 
theory of rumination. According to this theory, rumination is characterized by a tendency to use 
higher-level, abstract construal when processing information or problem solving (Watkins, 
2008). This higher-level construal is also thought to lead the individual to show a greater degree 
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of behavioural consistency across situations (Watkins, 2008). If an individual is able to perceive 
their behavior as consistent, they may gain an increased sense of SCC even as their tendency to 
engage in abstract construal is conducive to rumination.  
These results of a trend towards a positive relationship between state SCC and state 
rumination when aggregated across time contradict previous cross-sectional findings that 
indicated a negative association between trait SCC and trait rumination (Campbell, 1996). They 
also contradict the negative correlation that we obtained using the SCCS and RRQ trait measures 
before the daily measurements were taken. The difference in results may due to differences in 
methodologies. Campbell’s study (1996) also used the SCCS and RRQ. These questionnaires ask 
participants to make generalizations about themselves across time and across situations. As they 
require a degree of abstraction about the self, the measures may have been partly registering a 
negative or self-deprecating style of response. Using these measures, individuals with negative 
self-evaluations or self-derogating response style may be more likely to indicate low SCC 
together with high rumination. In contrast, the state measures in this study asked participants to 
pay attention to their internal experiences in the here-and-now and disregard how they typically 
feel. The responses may have therefore been less influenced by participants’ general beliefs 
about themselves and more reflective of how frequently the variables actually co-occur.  
 The results from the Granger Causality Analysis suggest that changes in SCC temporally 
precede changes in rumination, supporting our hypothesis. However, our prediction of a 
feedback relationship between SCC and rumination was not supported. Indeed, while rumination 
predicted instantaneous SCC (particularly for individuals lower in trait rumination), it did not 
predict SCC at a lag. As a prediction at a lag is necessary to infer temporal progression, it 
appears that changes in SCC may precede changes in rumination, but not vice versa. These 
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results are consistent with the goal-processing or control theories of rumination (Martin & 
Tesser, 1996). If one accepts the premise that human beings have an inherent motivation to 
achieve self-clarity, then low state SCC could be perceived as a frustrated goal. Rumination 
would then occur in response to this goal discrepancy. That lagged rumination did not also 
significantly predict later SCC is surprising. These findings suggest that a sense of self-
knowledge is independent at any one time from the preceding thoughts patterns one had, and 
instead may be influenced by other factors, such as positive or negative events or mood. Another 
possibility is that rumination did affect later SCC, but that the effect passed too quickly to be 
detected by our measures.  
 Our hypotheses regarding high dialectical self-concept predicting lower state SCC were 
not supported. Previous research has found that individuals high in naïve dialecticism show SCC 
equal to those low in naïve dialecticism when asked about their self-clarity in specific relational 
roles or contexts (English & Chen, 2007). As the state SCC measures used in this study asked 
participants to focus on how they felt in the moment rather than across all situations, perhaps 
participants high in naïve dialecticism were focusing on their situation-specific or role-specific 
sense of themselves. In that case, we would not expect their SCC to diverge from those of 
participants low in naïve dialecticism. Indeed, this study has provided valuable insight into the 
effect (or lack thereof) of naïve dialecticism on state self-clarity; while individuals who are high 
in naïve dialecticism may report lower trait SCC when asked to generalize, at any one time they 
appear to experience equal levels of state SCC to those who are low in naïve dialecticism.   
 The results of this study have several important implications. Self-focused rumination has 
been linked to depression and anxiety, and reducing rumination has been an aim of several types 
of therapy (e.g.: Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2013). Studies 1 and 2 have provided temporal 
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information about a phenomenon that appears to precede rumination, namely change from high 
to low state SCC. Indeed, our findings provide additional support for the theory that rumination 
is a coping response to sensations of uncertainty, in this case uncertainty about the self-concept. 
While frequent rumination did not appear to affect long-term SCC in our study, other research 
has described several negative outcomes of habitual rumination. As such, clinicians could 
explore the presence of any metacognitive beliefs surrounding rumination and self-clarity, as 
well as introduce other coping mechanisms. Another option would be to introduce the notion of 
achieving greater tolerance towards the momentary experience of self-uncertainty, such as 
through mindfulness training.  
 On a more general note, this study has provided us with real-time information on how 
individuals react to self-confusion and attempt to make meaning. The search for self-cohesion 
and consistency has been posited by some theorists to be a universal motivating factor (Heine, 
Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). Many research studies have examined how self-uncertainty influences 
group identification, extreme attitudes, or behaviours that affirm the self. This study has added to 
the existing literature by demonstrating the existence of other internal coping responses to self-
confusion, namely changes in the frequency and manner in which the individual thinks about 
herself.    
 This study has several limitations. Granger Causality Analysis, despite the name, can at 
best infer temporal progression. A true experimental study is necessary to infer causation. 
Despite this limitation, the benefit of an ESM study is that it allows us to observe a person’s 
subjective experiences as they unfold in everyday life (Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 
2007); what is lost in causal inference is gained in validity. As well, the sample in this study was 
limited to undergraduate students, all under the age of 30 with the majority in their early 
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twenties. University and young adulthood can be a time of identity exploration and shifting 
(Arnett, 2007; Gore & Cross, 2014). This may reduce our ability to generalize these findings to a 
population of adults more diverse in age, education, or socioeconomic status. Our choice of 
signal period can also be a limitation. We chose to use two signals a day rather than more in 
order to reduce participant burden and prevent response fatigue, particularly to the SCC variable, 
which in the past has only been studied on a once daily basis. It is possible that further 
fluctuations in the variables were lost in the time periods between signals. Lastly, this study 
relied on self-report measures. Future studies may attempt to use less direct measures in order to 
study the relationship between rumination and SCC.  
 Based on our results, there are several directions for future research. An experimental 
study in which self-concept clarity is manipulated and subsequent changes in rumination 
measured would provide more definitive support for changes from high to low state SCC leading 
to high state rumination. Equally, additional ESM studies using shorter signal scheduling periods 
could allow researchers to examine whether important fluctuations in the variables were missed 
in this study. Researchers could also expand the sample to include a wider demographic of 
participants in order to observe whether the relationship between rumination and SCC is constant 
through developmental stages or changes based on age. Lastly, an interesting area of research 
would be to include a clinical sample in the study, as the relationship between the variables 
might differ in the presence of psychopathology such as depression. 
Conclusions 
 Based on an experience sampling methodology study, rumination and SCC have a 
significant negative relationship when viewed within each subject, but across time and subjects 
there was a trend of state SCC positively predicting state rumination. These results suggest that 
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the immediate and cumulative impact of the variables might differ. Further, Granger Causality 
Analysis suggested that changes in SCC temporally precede changes in rumination. Self-focused 
rumination may therefore be an attempt to cope with self-confusion. The results of this study 
have provided information as to how a sense of self influences self-focused cognitive patterns. 
As rumination has been linked to several types of psychopathology, the results of the study could 
have important implications for clinical interventions.  
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General Discussion 
 The purpose of the two papers included in this dissertation was to describe the nature of the 
relationship between self-concept clarity and rumination using distinct but complementary 
methodologies. The first paper used a rumination manipulation in order to measure the effect of 
rumination on SCC compared to distraction. The second paper used ESM in order to describe the 
temporal relationship between rumination and SCC as they fluctuate during everyday life. The 
questions addressed in this dissertation arose from a review of the research literature, in which 
there was evidence to suggest that people believe rumination leads to self-insight (Lyubomirsky 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001), as well as findings suggesting a link 
between uncertainty and rumination (De et al., 2012; Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 
1999; van Randenborgh, de Jong-Meyer, & Huffmeier, 2010; Ward et al., 2003).  
 The findings of the two papers suggest that the relationship between SCC and rumination is 
more complex than a mere negative association. The laboratory study found that state rumination 
influenced state SCC only when the individual was already low in trait SCC. These results make 
intuitive sense, as we would expect that individuals who habitually have low confidence in their 
personal attributes and low sense of stability and coherence in the self-concept would have state 
SCC that is more reactive. Previous research has shown that those with low trait SCC have 
greater fluctuations in state SCC (Nezlek & Plesco, 2001). On the other hand, the ESM study 
found that while there was an instantaneous causation relationship from rumination to SCC that 
was moderated by trait SCC, based on lagged analysis state SCC seemed to temporally precede 
state rumination. Furthermore, the ESM study found that while the within-subjects relationship 
between SCC and rumination was negative, between subjects there was a trend towards SCC 
positively predicting rumination.  
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 How to interpret these seemingly contradictory results? There are several possible 
explanations. One potential reason for the difference in results between the laboratory study and 
ESM findings is that the studies operationalized state rumination differently. In the laboratory 
study, participants were guided in a self-focusing exercise that lasted eight minutes prior to the 
measurement of state SCC. In the ESM study, participants were asked about the self-focus, 
valence, and intrusiveness of the thought they were having prior to being signaled. Both methods 
have precedence in the research literature (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Takano & 
Tanno, 2011). The strength of the ESM study was its ability to tap into immediate present-
moment experience, without relying on participant recall. However, this meant that the ESM 
study did not collect information on the duration of the ruminative episode; participants could 
have been having self-focused thoughts for some time before and after the signal, or the thought 
could have been fleeting. It is therefore possible that only particularly long sessions of 
rumination affect SCC levels. Another related explanation for the findings is that the ESM study 
measured how individuals actually self-focus in everyday life, while the laboratory study 
required participants to engage in a task that may not actually represent their typical pattern of 
self-focus. For example, the rumination manipulation directed participants’ attention to their 
physical sensations and emotions, and asked them to think quite deeply about themselves, such 
as “whether [they] are fulfilled” or “why [they] turned out this way.” While we did not attempt a 
qualitative analysis of the content of the ESM participants’ thoughts, it seems unlikely that many 
were frequently having thoughts on this level of abstraction and self-exploration before being 
signaled. We could hypothesize that prolonged, intense self-focused rumination leads to shifts in 
state SCC for individuals low in trait SCC, but that this degree of rumination does not occur 
frequently during everyday life for a non-clinical undergraduate sample.  
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 Lastly, an explanation for the moderated causal relationship from rumination to SCC found 
in Paper 1 and the temporal progression from SCC to rumination and lack of feedback 
relationship found in Paper 2 could be due to the difference in measurement times between the 
two studies. In the laboratory induction study, the effect of rumination on SCC was measured 
almost immediately after the induction, following a quick manipulation check. In the ESM study, 
participants were only signaled twice a day, so the length of time between the measurement of 
rumination and measurement of its lagged effect on SCC spanned several hours. It is possible 
that the effect of rumination on state SCC is swifter than our ESM schedule was able to capture. 
This explanation is supported by the finding that state rumination demonstrated instantaneous 
causation with state SCC in the ESM study. On the other hand, the lagged effect of state SCC on 
rumination appears to be long lasting, and could be captured by our sampling methods.  
 When viewing the two papers simultaneously, we could conclude that a prolonged period 
of rumination in which individuals are induced to think about themselves quite deeply influences 
state SCC when state SCC is measured immediately following the rumination induction, though 
only for participants already low in trait SCC. On the other hand, when viewing rumination as it 
actually unfolds in the lives of a nonclinical sample, changes in state SCC predict later changes 
in state rumination, while changes in state rumination only predicts immediate measurements of 
state SCC. The effects of rumination on SCC may be swift, while changes in SCC appear to have 
longer lasting effects on patterns of rumination.  
 Based on the findings of these papers, rumination appears to be used as a coping response 
to low self-clarity, and is present several hours after the downward shift in self-clarity occurred. 
This finding is consistent with previous research in which rumination was associated with 
intolerance of uncertainty, or the tendency to find uncertainty distressing and unacceptable (de 
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Jong et al., 2009; Liao & Wei, 2011). Given the high importance placed on self-clarity and 
strong motivation to achieve it, self-uncertainty may be uncomfortable even for those who are 
usually tolerant of uncertainty. As many people seem to believe that self-focus leads to self-
insight, many may have the metacognitive belief that ruminating about the self will lead to 
greater self-clarity. The negative instantaneous relationship between rumination and SCC as well 
as the lack of lagged effects of rumination on SCC suggest that this metacognitive belief is 
incorrect.   
 Our results also suggest that prolonged, intense periods of rumination lead to immediate 
and temporarily decreased self-clarity in individuals already low in trait SCC. These results 
support previous research demonstrating that rumination increases uncertainty, but adds the 
qualification that uncertainty only increased for those who habitually experience uncertainty 
about the topic. Rumination does not cause uncertainty about the self if the person feels 
confident about the self-concept. Instead, rumination appears to leave those with high trait SCC 
unaffected, and increases uncertainty that is already present in those with low SCC.  
 The implications and limitations of these papers have already been discussed. However, 
after considering the papers in unison it becomes additionally evident that this research would be 
completed by a study in which SCC is experimentally manipulated in order to measure changes 
in rumination. Such a study would allow us to reach stronger conclusions about the nature and 
direction of the relationship between the two variables.  
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Conclusion 
 The findings of this research suggest that induced rumination leads to lower state SCC in 
individuals who rate themselves as having low trait SCC. When viewed without manipulation, 
changes in state SCC appear to have long lasting effect on state rumination, while changes in 
state rumination appear to only affect instantaneous SCC. Together, these results suggest that 
rumination could be a coping strategy in response to the experience of self-uncertainty. 
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Table 1 
 
Ethnicity Information for Study 1 
 
Ethnicity Number Percentage 
Aboriginal 0 0 
Arab/West Asian 22 11.458 
Black 27 14.062 
Chinese 14 7.292 
Filipino 9 4.688 
Korean 2 1.042 
Japanese 0 0 
South Asian 47 24.479 
Southeast Asian 6 3.125 
Latin American 6 3.125 
White 51 26.563 
Other 8 4.167 
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Table 2  
Means and Standard Deviations for Measures Used in Study 1 
Measure Mean Standard Deviation 
SCC 35.24 7.947 
RRQ 42.08 7.698 
DSS 122.6 18.424 
Confidence SCC 85.93 9.483 
TwoQ SCC 7.182 1.679 
State Rumination 8.682 1.968 
 
Note: SCCS = Self-Concept Clarity Scale. RRQ = Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire. DSS = 
Dialectical-Self Scale. Confidence SCC = Measure of self-concept clarity derived from 
confidence in personality ratings. TwoQ SCC = measure of state self-concept clarity based on 
two item questionnaire.  
 
Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of Trait Measures Used in Study 2 
Measure Mean Standard Deviation 
SCC 35.88 7.164 
RRQ 52.45 6.724 
DSS 120.6 18.310 
Note: SCCS = Self-Concept Clarity Scale. RRQ = Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire. DSS = 
Dialectical-Self Scale. 
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Table 4 
 
Power Simulation Results for N = 40, Between Group Effect Size = -0.5, Within Group Effect 
Size = 0.5 
p Within Between Contextual 
0.05 1 1 1 
0.01 1 0.999 1 
0.001 1 0.995 1 
1E-04 1 0.977 1 
 
Note: simulation results based on 1000 iterations. Within = likelihood of avoiding Type II error 
when measuring within subject effects. Between = likelihood of avoiding Type II error when 
measuring between subject effects. Contextual = likelihood of avoiding Type II error in 
determining significant difference in slopes between within group effects and between group 
effects. p = significance criterion. The numbers in the charts represent the proportion of cases 
where you would reject the null hypothesis. 
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Table 5 
Power Simulations Results for N = 20, Between Group Effect Size = -0.5, Within Group Effect 
Size = 0.5 
p Within Between Contextual 
0.05 1 0.985 1 
0.01 1 0.932 1 
0.001 1 0.745 1 
1E-04 1 0.487 0.989 
 
Note: simulation results based on 1000 iterations. 
Table 6  
Power Simulation Results for N = 20, Between Group Effect Size = -0.2 Within Group Effect 
Size = 0.2 
p Within Between Contextual 
0.05 0.962 0.437 0.889 
0.01 0.879 0.219 0.677 
0.001 0.651 0.066 0.338 
1E-04 0.425 0.015 0.107 
 
Note: simulation results based on 1000 iterations. 
  74 
 
Table 7 
Power Simulation Results for N = 20, Between Group Effect Size = -0.3 Within Group Effect 
Size = 0.3 
p Within Between Contextual 
0.05 1 0.733 0.997 
0.01 0.999 0.521 0.961 
0.001 0.986 0.248 0.806 
1E-04 0.949 0.092 0.539 
 
Note: simulation results based on 1000 iterations. 
Table 8 
Power Simulation Results for N = 20, Between Group Effect Size = 0.0, Within Group Effect Size 
= 0.2 
p Within Between Contextual 
0.05 1 0.067 0.677 
0.01 1 0.02 0.392 
0.001 0.99 0 0.121 
1E-04 0.946 0 0.025 
 
Note: simulation results based on 1000 iterations. 
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Table 9 
Power Simulation Results for N = 30, Between Group Effect Size = -0.3, Within Group Effect 
Size = 0.3 
p Within Between Contextual 
0.05 1 0.917 0.999 
0.01 1 0.769 0.991 
0.001 1 0.493 0.989 
1E-04 1 0.262 0.934 
 
Note: simulation results based on 1000 iterations. 
Table 10 
Power Simulation Results for N = 40, Between Group Effect Size = -0.2, Within Group Effect 
Size = 0.2 
p Within Between Contextual 
0.05 1 0.756 0.998 
0.01 0.997 0.52 0.975 
0.001 0.983 0.246 0.885 
1E-04 0.926 0.098 0.697 
 
Note: simulation results based on 1000 iterations. 
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Table 11 
Power Simulation Results for N = 30, Between Group Effect Size = -0.2, Within Group Effect 
Size = 0.2 
p Within Between Contextual 
0.05 0.999 0.615 0.97 
0.01 0.982 0.379 0.876 
0.001 0.918 0.139 0.681 
1E-04 0.764 0.042 0.402 
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Appendix A 
Distraction induction (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998) 
 
Instructions: 
 
For the next few minutes, try your best to focus your attention on each of the ideas on the 
following pages. Read each item slowly and silently to yourself.  As you read the items, use your 
imagination and concentration to focus your mind on each of the ideas.  Spend a few moments 
visualizing and concentrating on each item. 
 
Think about: and imagine a boat slowly crossing the Atlantic 
Think about: the layout of a typical classroom 
Think about: the shape of a large black umbrella 
Think about: the movement of an electric fan on a warm day 
Think about: raindrops sliding down a windowpane 
Think about: a double-decker bus driving down a street 
Think about: and picture a full moon on a clear night 
Think about: clouds forming in the sky 
Think about: the layout of the local shopping center 
Think about: and imagine a plane flying overhead 
Think about: fire darting around a log in a fire-place 
Think about: and concentrate on the expression on the face of the Mona Lisa 
Think about: a parking lot at a drive-in 
Think about: two birds sitting on a tree branch 
Think about: the shadow of a stop sign 
Think about: the layout of the local post office 
Think about: the structure of a high-rise office building 
Think about: and picture the Eiffel Tower 
Think about: and imagine a truckload of watermelons 
Think about: the pattern on an Oriental rug 
Think about: the “man in the moon” 
Think about: the shape of the continent of Africa 
Think about: a band playing outside 
Think about: a group of polar bears fishing in a stream 
Think about: the shape of the torch on the Statue of Liberty 
Think about: the shape of the state of California 
Think about: the way the Grand Canyon looks at sunset 
Think about: the structure of a long bridge 
Think about: a train stopped at a station 
Think about: a lone cactus in the desert 
Think about: the shape of the country of Italy 
Think about: a row of shampoo bottles on display 
Think about: a gas station on the side of a highway 
Think about: the fuzz on the shell of a coconut 
Think about: the Presidents' faces on Mount Rushmore 
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Think about: and picture the UCR watch tower 
Think about: a band playing "The Star Spangled Banner" 
Think about: the shape of a cello 
Think about: a puddle in the middle of a sidewalk 
Think about: the shape of the United States 
Think about: the baggage claim area at the airport 
Think about: the size of the Statue of Liberty 
Think about: the shape of a baseball glove 
Think about: a freshly painted door 
Think about: the shiny surface of a trumpet 
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Appendix B 
Rumination Induction (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998) 
 
Instructions: 
 
For the next few minutes, try your best to focus your attention on each of the ideas on the 
following pages. 
Read each item slowly and silently to yourself.  As you read the items, use your imagination and 
concentration to focus your mind on each of the ideas.  Spend a few moments visualizing and 
concentrating on each item. 
 
Think about: the physical sensations you feel in your body 
Think about: your character and who you strive to be 
Think about: the degree of clarity in your thinking right now 
Think about: why you react the way you do 
Think about: the way you feel inside 
Think about: the possible consequences of your current mental state 
Think about: how similar/different you are relative to other people 
Think about: what it would be like if your present feelings lasted 
Think about: why things turn out the way they do 
Think about: trying to understand your feelings 
Think about: how awake/tired you feel now 
Think about: the amount of tension in your muscles 
Think about: whether you are fulfilled 
Think about: your physical appearance 
Think about: whether you feel stressed right now 
Think about: the long-term goals you have set 
Think about: the amount of certainty you feel 
Think about: your present feelings of fatigue/energy 
Think about: possible explanations for your physical sensations 
Think about: how hopeful/hopeless you are feeling 
Think about: the level of motivation you feel right now 
Think about: the degree of helplessness you feel 
Think about: the degree of calmness/restlessness you feel 
Think about: the possible consequences of the way you feel  
Think about: what your feelings might mean 
Think about: how sad/happy you are feeling 
Think about: the expectations your family has for you 
Think about: why your body feels this way 
Think about: why you get this way sometimes 
Think about: how passive/active you feel 
Think about: what people notice about your personality 
Think about: the kind of student you are and wish you were 
Think about: how weak/strong your body feels now 
Think about: the degree of relaxation/agitation you feel 
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Think about: the kind of person you think you should be 
Think about: the degree of control you feel right now 
Think about: what would happen if your current physical state lasted 
Think about: sitting down and analyzing your personality 
Think about: why you turned out this way 
Think about: the things that are most important in your life 
Think about: how quick/slow your thinking is right now 
Think about: the degree of decisiveness you feel 
Think about: trying to understand who you are 
Think about: how you feel about your friendships 
Think about: whether you have accomplished a lot so far 
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Appendix C 
The Rumination and Reflection Questionnaire  
 
(Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement by 
clicking one of the scale categories underneath the statement. 
 
1. My attention is often focused on aspects of myself I wish I’d stop thinking about. 
2. I always seem to be “re-hashing” in my mind recent things I’ve said or done. 
3. Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself. 
4. Long after an argument or disagreement is over with, my thoughts keep going back to 
what happened. 
5. I tend to “ruminate” or dwell over things that happen to me for a really long time 
afterward. 
6. I don’t waste time re-thinking things that are over and done with. 
7. Often I’m playing back over in my mind how I acted in a past situation. 
8. I often find myself re-evaluating something I’ve done. 
9. I never ruminate or dwell on myself for very long. 
10. It is easy for me to put unwanted thoughts out of my mind. 
11. I often reflect on episodes in my life that I should no longer concern myself with.  
12. I spend a great deal of time thinking back over my embarrassing or disappointing 
moments. 
13. Philosophical or abstract thinking doesn’t appeal to me that much. 
14. I’m not really a meditative type of person. 
15. I love exploring my “inner” self. 
16. My attitudes and feelings about things fascinate me. 
17. I don’t really care for introspective or self-reflective thinking. 
18. I love analyzing why I do things. 
19. People often say I’m a “deep,” introspective type of person. 
20. I don’t care much for self-analysis. 
21. I’m very self-inquisitive by nature. 
22. I love to meditate on the nature and meaning of things. 
23. I often look at my life in philosophical ways. 
24. Contemplating myself isn’t my idea of fun. 
 
Participants respond on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). 
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Self-Concept Clarity Scale  
 
(Campbell & Trapnell, 1996) 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement by 
clicking one of the scale categories underneath the statement. 
 
1. My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another 
2. On one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I might have a 
different opinion. 
3. I spend a lot of time wondering about what kind of person I really am. 
4. Sometimes I feel that I am not really the person I appear to be.  
5. When I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I’m not sure what I was 
really like.  
6. I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my personality. 
7. Sometimes I think I know other people better than I know myself. 
8. My beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently. 
9. If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being different 
from one day to another. 
10. Even if I wanted to, I don’t think I could tell someone what I’m really like. 
11. In general, I have a clear sense of who and what I am. 
12. It is often hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don’t really know what 
I want.  
 
Participants respond on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). 
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State Rumination Measure (Takano & Tanno, 2011):  
 
 
In a brief sentence, what were you thinking about before you were signaled? 
 
 
To what extent were you…. 
 
1. Thinking about yourself? 
2. Having thoughts that were difficult to control? 
3. Having thoughts that were unpleasant? 
 
Participants respond on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  
 
 
State Self-Concept Clarity (adapted from Campbell & Trapnell, 1996): 
 
 
Please respond to the following statements based on how you feel right now about yourself and 
your life, even if it does not reflect how you usually feel: 
 
1. You had a clear sense of who and what you were 
2. You are not really the person you appear to be 
 
Participants respond on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree) 
 
Social Interaction 
 
Were you engaging in a social interaction at the time you were signaled? 
 
Affect 
 
On a scale from 1 – 9, how high is your current arousal level? (1 = very low arousal, 9 = very 
high arousal) 
On a scale from 1 – 9, with 1 being "Very unpleasant" and 9 being "Very pleasant," how pleasant 
or unpleasant are you currently feeling? 
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Dialectical Self Scale (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010) 
 
Listed below are a number of statements about your thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Select the 
number that best matches your agreement or disagreement with each statement. Use the 
following scale, which ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). There are no right 
or wrong answers. 
 
             1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
           Strongly disagree                       Neither agree Nor disagree              Strongly agree 
          
 
DT1  I am the same around my family as I am around my friends. (reversed) 
DT2  When I hear two sides of an argument, I often agree with both. 
DT3  I believe my habits are hard to change. (reversed) 
DT4  I believe my personality will stay the same all of my life. (reversed) 
DT5  I often change the way I am, depending on who I am with.    
DT6  I often find that things will contradict each other. 
DT7  If I’ve made up my mind about something, I stick to it. (reversed)  
DT8  I have a definite set of beliefs, which guide my behavior at all times. (reversed) 
DT9  I have a strong sense of who I am and don’t change my views when others 
disagree  
with me. (reversed) 
DT10  The way I behave usually has more to do with immediate circumstances than with  
my personal preferences. 
DT11  My outward behaviors reflect my true thoughts and feelings. (reversed)      
DT12  I sometimes believe two things that contradict each other. 
DT13  I often find that my beliefs and attitudes will change under different contexts. 
DT14  I find that my values and beliefs will change depending on who I am with. 
DT15  My world is full of contradictions that cannot be resolved. 
DT16  I am constantly changing and am different from one time to the next. 
DT17  I usually behave according to my principles. (reversed) 
DT18  I prefer to compromise than to hold on to a set of beliefs. 
DT19  I can never know for certain that any one thing is true.      
DT20  If there are two opposing sides to an argument, they cannot both be right. 
(reversed) 
DT21  My core beliefs don’t change much over time. (reversed)   
DT22  Believing two things that contradict each other is illogical. (reversed) 
DT23 I sometimes find that I am a different person by the evening than I was in the 
morning. 
DT24  I find that if I look hard enough, I can figure out which side of a controversial 
issue  
is right. (reversed) 
DT25  For most important issues, there is one right answer. (reversed) 
DT26  I find that my world is relatively stable and consistent. (reversed) 
DT27  When two sides disagree, the truth is always somewhere in the middle. 
DT28  When I am solving a problem, I focus on finding the truth. (reversed) 
DT29  If I think I am right, I am willing to fight to the end (reversed). 
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DT30  I have a hard time making up my mind about controversial issues. 
DT31  When two of my friends disagree, I usually have a hard time deciding which of  
them is right.         
DT32  There are always two sides to everything, depending on how you look at it. 
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